Category — Risk

The opening session today in the ongoing OECD Forum 2010 was on the future of capitalism, where economic historian Anatole Kaletsky argued that “we’re entering a new period of pragmatism, when ideology will give way to a more “common sense” approach.” Arguably, this is not such a radical notion; the financial crisis has shown in a dramatic way that there have been some serious cracks in what has commonly been accepted as “good” economic policy. It is easy to blame greed and carelessness in the financial sector, but that hardly goes to the heart of the problem. At the end of the day, even if the greed and carelessness of a few “evil bankers” really is to blame, policy has to change if the economic structures have been conducive to making it cause despair for millions of people.

Aside from highlighting dysfunctional economic structures and the need for reform, a very immediate consequence of the crisis is that Governments have been [Read more →]

According to the Washington consensus, open international capital flows were essential to developing countries in order to achieve cheap financing and efficient allocation of resources. In particular, the IMF and the World Bank were stalwart defenders of floating the exchange rate and letting the market forces determine the inflows and outflows of capital of a country.

Classical development economists, such as the Estonian Ragnar Nurkse, pointed out the fragility of relying on external financing as early as 1944 and paradoxically laid the basis for the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank). With Bretton Woods came the managed flow of international capital, but which collapsed in 1968 and led to subsequent liberalization. In receiving aid and loans from the World Bank and IMF, developing countries were pressured to liberalize and open their economies to foreign investors.

After the Asian crisis of 1997, more attention was paid to fragility that arises when foreign investors withdraw capital and local currencies collapse. The problem is especially acute when locals have taken up loans denominated in foreign currencies, thus the depreciation causes their debts to sky-rocket. But it is first recently that mainstream economists have argued for letting developing countries control the capital inflows.

I find it very warming that both the IMF and World Bank seem to have changed tack, and returned to their more Nurksean / Keynesian roots. In this very interesting blogpost, Jamus Lim of the World Bank presents data that out of 189 major capital account liberalizations since 1970, at least 154  have led to a severe financial crisis!  He concludes by quoting a recent IMF staff paper.

“Finally, the the selective use (PDF) of capital controls in a broad policy mix may be useful in helping moderate surges in portfolio inflows, especially when they are directed toward debt rather than equity. “

Striking words when coming from Washington indeed.  More depressingly though, Estonia seems to have forgotten the lessons from its premier economist.

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If you are interested in the topic of international financial fragility, the excellent work of  Jan Kregel and Hyman Minsky is recommended.

The United States is not the only place where offshore drilling has been on the political agenda during the last years. In Norway, where the offshore oil and gas industry is a significant part of the economy, making Norway the third largest oil exporter in the world, there has been debate about opening up scenic coastal areas of Lofoten and Vesterålen for offshore drilling. The Northern Norwegian coastal archipelagos feature amazingly scenic nature complete with fjords and mountains, the world’s largest population of cod along with a thriving fishing industry, and whether possible drilling in the area should be allowed to commence has already been the subject of intense debate.

Still, Norway’s Labor Party led coalition government is arguably leaning towards opening up the area for oil and gas investments, in spite of vocal protests from its Socialist Left Party members. It has certainly been  [Read more →]

We’ve previously endorsed the Norwegian Government Pension Fund’s  (GPF) approach to enhancing global corporate governance. Recently, NBIM – the manager of the fund – was also instructed to allocate about five percent of its portfolio into unlisted real estate. I consider this  decision quite bad for the following reasons.

Property investments are notoriously illiquid. Currently the reserves of the GPF is used to cover the domestic fiscal budget deficit. As wee have recently seen, the deficit and need for fiscal expansive policy will usually be the highest when liquidity is the lowest. Illiquidity  implies below real value prices and as such NBIM will always be selling its real estate investments when prices are the worst (this is in a longer term perspective when oil revenues are actually smaller than the budget deficit)

It was the Yale endowment fund under management by David Swensen that started advocating that long term investors such as the GPF should allocate more of its investments [Read more →]

Above: “I think this is a very good death”, Lord Katsumoto tells a perplexed Tom Cruise, soon to become The Last Samurai

Like Custer at Little Bighorn, Lehman Brothers bravely removed the possibility of surviving by means of a tactical retreat in case they were befallen by a great host of hostile Indians by making use of the now infamous repo 105 contracts. Andrew Clavell, author of Financial Crookery, posted an interesting article on how and why they work here. Especially recommended for those of our readers who aren’t working with or haven’t studied a lot of finance or derivatives.

Learning by analogy:

sometimes supposed solutions make the original problem worse. In whale-removal as well as in economics.

I recently read Siddharta by Hermann Hesse,  a wonderful book set in ancient India about a young man’s search for understanding and inner peace. Amongst other profoundities, the book also contains some interesting insights on trading and investment. After a thorough brahmin education, followed by three years of life as an ascetic sadhu, the young Siddharta becomes an apprentice under a rich merchant. Only knowing how to, according to himself, think, wait, and fast, he quickly becomes a highly successful and very rich merchant. Importantly, he does this not by using greed or a hunger for “success” as a motivation, but rather by means of cool detachment. Hesse, of course, describes this far more eloquently than I could ever hope to:

“This Brahmin,” [the master merchant Kamaswami] said to a friend, “is not a proper merchant and will never be one; never is his heart passionately engaged in our transactions. But he has the secret of those to whom success comes of ts own accors, be it that he was born under a lucky star, be it magic, be it something he learned among the Samanas. He seems only to be playing at doing business. Never do the transactions have any real effect on him; never are they his master; never does he fear failure or worry over a loss.”

There is an interesting connection here, of course, to modern “practical investment” literature, in which the virtues of emotional control and self discipline are frequently emphasized as being of critical importance to success. The lesson to be drawn from Hesse, then, is perhaps that one possibly extremely effective way of achieving this just this is to not care very much about money – in a Siddhartian sense, “rise above” is perhaps a more appropriate choice of words.

It might not be so easy, though. In Hesse’s work,  Siddhartas spirituality is almost completely killed off by many years of hedonism and financial success – and he becomes so emotionally and philosophically tortured that he abandons his life as a wealthy merchant and almost commits suicide.

The Fall of Icarus by Rubens 1633

Intuitively, large foreign account reserves should be a cushion against runs on the local currency especially for countries with high foreign debt levels or lots of foreign investments that at some point need to be repatriated. If you don’t have enough foreign currency to repay, crisis will surely follow as we have seen during the many Latin-American or Asian balance of payment crises. As such, China’s enormous reserves of about 5-6 percent of global GDP should be reassuring, but as Michael Pettis explains the risks that threaten large developing countries are quite different from those smaller countries can experience.

“The risks that China faces today (and the US in the late 1920s and Japan in the late 1980s) is of excessive domestic liquidity having fueled asset and capacity bubbles, the latter requiring the uninterrupted ability of foreign countries to absorb via large and growing trade deficits. These risks include an explosion in domestic government debt directly and contingently through the banking system.”

Quite similar to what countries rich in natural resources often experience, where large inflows of foreign currency and current account surpluses cause bubbles to arise. And importantly, as foreign reserves cannot be used to solve the problems the solution lies domestically through higher interest rates, less lending, stronger currency and consequentially a less competitive export industry.

We all know what happened to the US and Japan, hopefully China will manage better.

Read the whole post over at China Financial Markets here

Rescuing a virgin in dire straits

The development of Norway’s soverign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund (GPF), has always been interesting. GPF will this year attend 2000 meetings with American companies, in which they own up to 5 percent, urging them to separate the role of CEO and Chairman. They hope to make the governance structure more transparent and independent. Governance structure in many American corporations is arguably quite old fashioned and this should be a welcome nudge in the right direction. It’s hard to argue this to be a bad thing and it could quite possibly increase returns for Norway in the long run. Even a marginal increase would be significant as the stated investment horizion of the fund is infinite, that is until the collapse of the universe or the world financial system, whichever should come first.

The authors of this blog merrily receive about 82000 Norwegian kroner (NOK, €10 000) every academic year in living support for students from the Government of Norway. As we study in Estonia and do not engage in currency hedging, our standard of living (in economic terms) is subject to the NOK/EUR exchange rate. (Estonia has pegged its currency to the Euro and is most probably joining next year)

Over at Financial Times they report that Credit Suisse has made its currency predictions for the next year and betting on the strength of the krone and selling the Euro. With the budget balance and current account surplus larger than 10 percent of GDP, lowest unemployment rate in Europe and buoyant stock and housing markets Norway looks like a sure bet. It looks like we can expect a lenient new year in Tallinn.

Of course there are certain caveats to such a prediction. Foreign exchange markets are notoriously hard to predict and from what I remember investment banks tend to fare worse than just predicting the current exchange rate. Further, as a small economy, Norway would suffer under the curse of small currencies if a new financial crisis was to arise (which many are predicting). Last, the krone correlates rather well with the oil price which might / might not be a benefit for an eventual speculator.

Thanks go to Radu, a loyal evolution-revolution reader, for sharing the FT-article.

Update (May 4th, 2010): More on the Future Prospects of the Norwegian Krone (it’s still on the way up) – New article